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WESLEY J. SMITH, FORCED ExrT: THE SLIPPERY SLOPE FROM ASSISTED
SUICIDE TO LEGALIZED MURDER
JULIE A. FINEGAN
During the fall of 1998, one of the top news stories in the Balti-
more-Washington metropolitan area was that of Hugh Finn, who was
left in a permanent vegetative state after a car accident, and his fam-
ily's struggle to decide upon his fate.' Finn's wife and sisters sought to
have his feeding tube removed and intravenous fluids discontinued.2
However, his brothers and parents argued that Finn, because of his
religious beliefs,3 would not have wanted to end his life.4 Prince Wil-
liam CircuitJudge Frank A. Hoss, Jr. determined that the testimony of
Finn's wife and attorney provided sufficient evidence that he would
not want to be kept alive under such conditions; therefore, artificial
nutrition could be withdrawn.5 Despite an appeal to the Virginia
Supreme Court by Governor James Gilmore6 and efforts by a state
legislator to prevent the removal of the feeding tube,7 Finn's wife pre-
vailed.' The feeding tube was removed and intravenous fluids were
discontinued.9 Eight days later, on October 9, 1998, Finn died. °
The saga of Hugh Finn and his family sparked much debate."l
Reporters discussed how different religious denominations viewed
1. See Brooke A. Masters, Conscious of a Life in the Balance: Brain Injured Man's Divided
Family Caught in Legal, Medical Netherworld, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1998, at BI [hereinafter
Conscious of a Life in the Balance].
2. See id.
3. Finn was a practicing Roman Catholic. See Brooke A. Masters, Family Reunites as
Hundreds Mourn Finn; Pastor Calls for Forgiveness, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1998, at B4.
4. See Conscious of a Life in the Balance, supra note 1.
5. See Brooke A. Masters, The Battle Outlives Hugh Finn: Medical Examiner Tries to Take
Body, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1998, at Al.
6. See R. H. Melton & Brooke A. Masters, Court Rejects Gilmore's Bid to Overturn Finn
Ruling: Family Decision Stands to Let Newscaster Die, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1998, at B1. Gilmore
argued that a 1992 Virginia law that allowed the removal of feeding tubes from vegetative
patients should not apply to Finn. See id. Gilmore contended that Finn was not dying and
that the removal of the feeding tube was euthanasia, which is illegal. See id.
7. See id.
8. See Judge Rejects Legislator's Suit in Finn Case, WASH. POST, 'Oct. 9, 1998, at B3.
9. See Conscious of a Life in the Balance, supra note 1.
10. See id.
11. See infta notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
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end-of-life issues.12 Newspaper articles'debated whether the removal
of a feeding tube was tantamount to euthanasia.'" Interest in living
wills and advance directives increased.14 The question of whether a
living will was a suicide wish was raised.15 Writers examined the shift
from heart cessation to brain death as the determining factor of
death.16 Although none of these issues can be easily resolved, in
Forced Exit, 7 Wesley J. Smith explores end of life decision-making is-
sues and expresses his opinion that legalized assisted suicide will lead
us down "the slippery slope from assisted suicide to legalized
murder."18
Smith insinuates that we have already started down a slippery
slope by allowing the removal not only of artificial ventilation but also
of feeding tubes (artificial nutrition)." Smith builds his slippery
slope argument by creating doubt in the reader's mind as to how and
where a line could be drawn or a regulation could be devised to en-
sure that assisted suicide is available only to those with a hopeless ill-
ness or unbearable pain.2" His argument is presented not only
through a discussion of legal decisions and the structure of the health
care delivery system, but also through family testimonials and anecdo-
tal evidence. 2' In his book, he includes several case studies, which
provide a name, a biography, and a family behind the statistics.22 He
offers the viewpoints of nurses who care for people who are terminally
ill or in a permanent vegetative state.23
As evidenced by the tile, Smith seeks to convince the reader that
allowing assisted suicide in any circumstance will begin a dangerous
slide ending in the devaluation of the lives of the elderly, children
12. See, e.g., Caryle Murphy, When is it Time to Die? Faiths, Families Weigh End-of-Life Issues,
WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 1998, at Cl.
13. See, e.g., id.
14. See, e.g., Don Colburn, Facing Death With a Plan; Five Wishes' Living Will Aims to Help
Families Prepare for the End of Life, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 1998, at Z7; Jennifer Lenhart and
Justin Blum, Living-Will Inquiries Increase in Wake of Case, WASH. PoST, Oct. 11, 1998, at B1;
Murphy, supra note 12.
15. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 12.
16. See, e.g., Guy McKhann, The Modern Meaning of Death; And Why the Brain Is at the
Heart of It, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1998, at C1.
17. WESLEYJ. SMITH, FORCED EXIT: THE SLIPPERY SLOPE FROM ASSISTED SUICIDE TO LE-
GALIZED MURDER (1997).
18. Id.
19. See id. at 43.
20. See id at 50, 100, 122-23.
21. See id at 155-57, 159-60, 173-78, 188-91, 194-99.
22. See id at 39-42 (discussing Robert Wendland), 48-49 (discussing Christine Busala-
cchi), 52-60 (discussing Ronald Comeau), 60-64 (discussing Michael Martin).
23. See id. at 39, 48.
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with birth defects, and the disabled.24 His story is a compelling one,
skillfully crafted to unfold in a manner that will convince many read-
ers of the danger of the slippery slope. This book review consists of
two parts. Section I summarizes some of Forced Exit's major topics in-
cluding the removal of feeding tubes, euthanasia in Nazi Germany
and the Netherlands, legislation and lower court decisions leading to
the 1997 landmark United States Supreme Court cases, and the pre-
dicted impact of legalized euthanasia in the United States. In addi-
tion, Section I includes an update on key United States Supreme
Court decisions announced after Forced Exit was published.25
An examination of the strengths and weaknesses of Smith's argu-
ments follows in Section II. Readers may question Smith's presump-
tion that terminally ill individuals are at higher risk for suicide.26
Nonetheless, this assertion appears to be well-founded.2 7 However,
his distinction between the removal of life support and artificial nutri-
tion may not be satisfactory to all. Further, the implementation and
effectiveness of some of Smith's suggested alternatives may prove
daunting.2" Many of Smith's arguments could have greater impact if
he included any available statistics to support his theories.29 Addition-
ally, a more in-depth analysis of In re Quinlan, ° a landmark case on
this subject, would give his theories greater strength.31
I. SMITH's ARGUMENTS
A. The Discontinuation of Articial Nutrition
In chapter two, "Creating a Caste of Disposable People," Smith
examines the removal of feeding tubes, or "artificial nutrition," from
non-terminal patients.32 Smith explains that the use of "artificial nu-
trition" and fluids was once considered humane care, a category of
care that includes warmth, shelter, and cleanliness. 3 In contrast to
24. See id. at 166-67 (discussing the elderly), 106-08 (discussing children with birth de-
fects), 181-193 (discussing the disabled).
25. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793
(1997). See also infra notes 135-51 and accompanying text.
26. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 29-30.
27. See, e.g., id. at 29-30, 124-25. See also infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 212-26 and accompanying text.
29. See generally, e.g., SMITH, supra note 17, at 97-101. See also infra notes 202-11 and
accompanying text.
30. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
31. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 17, at 42-43, 134-35. See also infta notes 191-95 and ac-
companying text.
32. SMITH, supra note 17, at 36-89.
33. Id at 4243.
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humane care, medical care includes interventions such as surgery,
medications, and tests.3 4 He takes the view that the term "artificial
nutrition" was coined to create the appearance that food and water, or
humane care, are not what is really being withdrawn. 5 Instead, what
is being withdrawn is "artificial nutrition," or medical treatment.
36
The use of the term "artificial nutrition" was the first step in a "delib-
erate campaign" to desensitize the public to the withdrawal of food
and fluids from the permanently unconscious..
Smith notes that in 1986 the American Medical Association
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs issued a statement that treat-
ment, including artificial nutrition and hydration, may be discontin-
ued for individuals who are undoubtedly permanently unconscious."8
He discusses how such cases initially applied only to permanently un-
conscious individuals who had previously expressed that they would
want such treatment discontinued.39 Smith begins with the landmark
case Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.4" As the result of
a 1983 car accident, Nancy Cruzan was left severely disabled.
Although she was able to swallow small amounts of food, Cruzan was
unable to swallow enough to meet her daily needs.4' She was placed
on a feeding tube, and, one year after the American Medical Associa-
tion opinion, Cruzan's parents sued the Missouri Department of
Health to remove her nutrition and fluids.4 2 The Circuit Court or-
dered the hospital to comply with Cruzan's request, but the Missouri
Supreme Court reversed.43 The United States Supreme Court, agree-
ing that artificial nutrition is a form of medical treatment that can be
ethically withdrawn, held that Missouri law allowed life support to be
withdrawn from an incompetent patient if there was clear and con-
vincing evidence that the person would so desire.44
Smith illustrates how decisions have strayed from initially remov-
ing feeding tubes from completely unconscious individuals to remov-
ing artificial nutrition from those who may be conscious at some
level.45 He describes the cases of several individuals who were con-
34. See i&t at 43.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 42-45.
38. See id. at 44-45.
39. See'id at 44-47.
40. See id at 45-46 (discussing 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
41. See Cruzan v. Director Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 n.1 (1990).
42. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 45-46 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268).
43. See id. at 46 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268).
44. See id. at 46-47 (citing Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280).
45. See id. at 63-64.
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scious, although severely brain-damaged, whose families or guardians
sought to discontinue artificial nutrition.46 One such story is that of
Michael Martin, who was seriously injured when his car was struck by a
train.47 Prior to his accident, Martin had allegedly expressed to his
wife that if he ever suffered a devastating injury, he would not want to
live at a low-functioning level.4" After the accident by using a letter
board, Martin expressed that he was afraid for himself and that he was
afraid he would have to leave the facility where he was living.4" Even
though he was conscious, the Michigan Court of Appeals gave defer-
ence to his decision before the injury and not to his desire to continue
living expressed after the injury.5" Ultimately, the Michigan Supreme
Court ruled that the uncorroborated testimony of Martin's wife was
insufficient to meet the standard of clear and convincing evidence5"
required to withdraw treatment.52 Mrs. Martin's appeal to the United
States Supreme Court was denied, and Mr. Martin's feeding tube was
not removed.53
By describing the physical realities of dehydration, Smith bolsters
his argument that dehydrating conscious individuals is a dangerous
step.54 He notes that when conscious individuals are dehydrated, they
may be able to feel the pain associated with this ten-to-fourteen-day
death. Further, Smith describes how the patient's skin, lips, and
tongue crack, the drying of the mucus membranes and stomach lin-
ing, and the other physical realities of death by dehydration. 56 Addi-
tionally, he notes that doctors are uncertain about how much pain
medication is required to minimize the discomfort that conscious in-
dividuals may experience. 7
46. See id. at 48-64.
47. See id at 62.
48. See icL at 63.
49. See id at 60.
50. See id at 63.
51. See id. Clear and convincing evidence requires that the truth of the facts asserted
be highly probable. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 251 (6th ed. 1991).
52. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 64 (citing In re Michael Martin, 538 N.W. 2d 399, 413
(Mich. 1995)).
53. See id. at 64.
54. See id. at 50.
55. See id&
56. See id. (citing interview with Dr. William Burke).
57. See id. (citing In re Conservatorship of Robert Wendland No. 65669 Cal. Sup. Ct.
San Jouquin County, filed 1995, deposition of Dr. Ronald Cranford, at 48).
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B. Euthanasia in Nazi Germany and the Modern-Day Netherlands
Smith next shifts from examining issues surrounding the with-
drawal of treatment to actual euthanasia.5" For the purposes of this
book, Smith defines euthanasia as the killing of one person by an-
other because the person to be killed has a serious disease, injury,
disability, emotional or mental disturbance, or is elderly.59 He defines
assisted suicide as occurring when an individual who is seriously ill,
disabled, or elderly kills himself or herself with another person assist-
ing in or facilitating the termination of life.60 Smith uses the exam-
ples of Nazi Germany and the modern-day Netherlands to show how
quickly a society can go from accepting euthanasia in limited circum-
stances to accepting its use for children with birth defects and elderly
individuals with non-terminal illnesses. 61
The philosophical foundation for euthanasia in Germany began
with scholarly writings of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies supporting the practice.62 By 1938, relatives of dying persons
and severely disabled children were requesting permission from the
government to end the lives of their dying and disabled relatives.6'
German medical personnel first began killing children with birth de-
fects when parents turned them over despite suspecting their children
would be killed.64 Hitler gradually expanded euthanasia to include
severely mentally ill and retarded adults, criminally insane persons,
and individuals with conditions such as epilepsy, schizophrenia, and
paralysis.65 Although Hitler ordered that the German euthanasia pro-
gram be discontinued in 1941, many doctors continued to partici-
pate.66 While his examination of euthanasia in Nazi Germany is
largely based on historical accounts, Smith incorporates statistics from
a recent survey of medical doctors in the Netherlands to emphasize
how ineffective guidelines can be in preventing abuses.67
In 1973, the Netherlands permitted euthanasia under limited cir-
cumstances for cases where no other medical means would alleviate a
58. See, e.g., id. at 68-114.
59. See id at xxv.
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., id at 68-114.
62. See id, at 72-73 (citing ADOLF JOST, RIGHT TO DEATH (1895); ROLAND GERKAN,
EUTHANISE (1913); KARL BINDING & ALFRED HOCHE, PERMITTING THE DESTRUCTION OF LIFE
NOT WORTHY OF LIFE: ITS ExTENT AND FoRM (1920), in 8 L. & MED., 231-65 (1992)).
63. See id. at 77.
64. See it at 77-78.
65. See id. at 79.
66. See id. at 80-81.
67. See id. at 97-100.
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patient's suffering.68 Euthanasia has not been formally legalized in
the Netherlands, but it is not prosecuted if the doctors follow official
guidelines.69 The requirements include the following:
* The request must be of the patient's free will and not re-
sult from pressure by others;
" The request must be made repeatedly over a period of
time;
* The patient's suffering must be unbearable;
* The patient must be told about and have time to consider
alternatives to euthanasia;
* There must be no reasonable alternatives to relieve the
patient's suffering;
" Doctors must consult a colleague who has experience in
euthanasia;
" Only a doctor may euthanize; and
" A report must be filed with the coroner.70
Smith cites the 1990 Remmelink Report on the practice of eutha-
nasia in the Netherlands to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of these
guidelines. 71 This report showed that 90,000 deaths involved end-of-
life decision making. 72  Of those deaths, 2,300 people were
euthanized upon request and 400 died by physician-assisted suicide.73
There were 1,040 cases of involuntary euthanasia or lethal injections
given without request or consent.74 Of the involuntary euthanasia
cases, 145 were individuals who were still competent in making their
own medical decisions.75 Finally, 8,100 patients were given an inten-
tional overdose of pain-control medication with the intention of end-
ing their lives. 76 Although he provides two examples of involuntary
euthanasia, Smith does not provide a complete explanation of the
doctors' reasoning behind these 1,040 cases. 7 7
68. See id. at 93.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 96 (citing CARLOS GOMEZ, REGULATING DEATH 62 (1991)).
71. See id at 98 (citingJ. REMMELUNK ET AL., MEDICAL DECISIONS ABOUT THE END OF LIFE
(1991)). The Remmelink report surveyed over 400 physicians retrospectively on their posi-
tion and practice of euthanasia. See id. For six months, the same physicians recorded their
actions in cases with a fatal outcome. See id. Finally, a sampling of deaths were taken, and
the physicians asked for information about the cases. See id.
72. See id at 99 (citingJ. REMMELINK ET AL., MEDICAL DECISIONS ABOUT THE END OF LIFE
(1991)).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id
76. See id.
77. See id. at 100-01. In one case, Smith explains that a patient was euthanized against
the patient's will and without the treating doctor's knowledge. See id. The euthanizing
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Smith also cites a more recent study that indicates that the Rem-
melink Report may actually underestimate the incidence of euthana-
sia deaths.7" Based upon the results of this report, Smith suggests that
preventive guidelines and protections are ineffective in restricting eu-
thanasia.7" Contrasting the Netherlands's socialized medical system,
which provides virtually every citizen with medical care, with the
American for-profit health care system and level of uninsurance, ° he
warns that the American experience could be far worse.8 '
C. American Legal History
Smith also examines legislation and landmark legal battles in the
United States leading up to the time of publication. 2 For example,
beginning in the early 1990s, voters in Washington and California re-
jected two initiatives that would have legalized euthanasia.8 " Washing-
ton's Initiative 119, which would have allowed doctors to lethally inject
patients under some circumstances, lost fifty-four percent to forty-six
percent of the vote in the 1991 election. 4 The following year, fifty-
four percent of California voters also rejected euthanasia by voting
down Proposition 161.85
Oregon's Measure 16, also known as the Oregon Death with Dig-
nity Act, was successful.8 6 This 1994 measure allowing suicide for the
terminally ill who request medication for ending their livess 7 was nar-
rowly approved, earning fifty-one percent of the vote.88 The Death
with Dignity Act's provisions define a terminal illness as an incurable
disease that will result in death in less than six months.8" However,
doctor stated that the patient's bed was needed for another case. See id. (citing Interview
with Dr. K.F. Gunning). In another case, a nun was euthanized against her will because
her doctor felt she was in too much pain. See id. at 101 (citing Herbert Hendin, Assisted
Suicide, Euthanasia, and Suicide Prevention: The Implications of the Dutch Experience, 21 SUICIDE
& LIFE THREATENING BEHAV., Spring 1995, at 201-02).
78. See id. at 100. (citing Paul J. van der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical Prac-
tices Concerning the End of Life, 22 HEALTH POL'Y MONOGRAPHs 49 (1992)).
79. See id.
80. See id. at 93.
81. See id. at 109. See also infra notes 152-64 and accompanying text.
82. See id. at 115-41.
83. See id. at 116.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 121 (citing OR. REV. STAT. ch. 127.800 (1996)).
87. See id. at 116-17 (citing OR. REV. STAT. ch. 127.800 (1996)).
88. See id. at 116-17, 121.
89. See id. at 122 (citing OR. REV. STAT. ch. 127.800, §1.01(12) (1996)). The statute
requires that the attending physician make an initial determination that the patient has a
terminal disease. See id. The attending physician must then refer the patient to another
physician for a confirmation of the diagnosis. See id,
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Smith points to an Oregon Medical Association Poll showing that fifty
percent of doctors reported they did not feel competent to predict
when a patient had less than six months to live."° Smith also criticizes
the law for not adequately providing for effective depression screen-
ing since the law does not require a formal psychiatric evaluation.91 A
formal psychiatric evaluation is essential to diagnose depression, as
many medical doctors are not adequately trained to identify depres-
sion in their dying patients.92
Shortly after it passed, Dr. Gary Lee and several other plaintiffs
brought a lawsuit against Measure 16 in the United States District
Court. 3 Dr. Lee and the other plaintiffs, including a man dying of
AIDS and a diabetic, claimed that the basis of the law was the belief
that the lives of the terminally ill and disabled are less worthy of pro-
tection. 4 Judge Hogan of the United States District Court ruled that
Measure 16 was unconstitutional because it excluded terminally ill in-
dividuals from protections against suicide that Oregon laws provide to
others.95 Judge Hogan also noted that Oregon law provided residents
protection against suicide if they are found to be a danger to them-
selves.9 6 The court found that the law provided a means to commit
suicide to terminally ill individuals who may be incompetent, abused,
or unduly influenced prior to their decisions. 7 At the time Forced Exit
was written, the case was awaiting appeal with the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.9" In early 1997, after Forced Exit went
to press, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
overturned Judge Hogan's ruling by holding that the plaintiffs did not
have standing99 to challenge the law.1"' In other words, the plaintiffs,
90. See id. at 123 (citing Patrick O'Neill, Suicide Aid Worries Oregon Doctors, PORTLAND
ORaGONtAN, Feb. 1, 1996).
91. See id. at 124 (discussing OR. REV. STAT. ch. 127.800 et seq. (1996)).
92. See id.
93. See id. at 125 (citing Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1421, 1438 (D. Or. 1995)).
94. See id. at 126 (citing Lee v. Harcleroad, Case No. 94-6467-TC, U.S. District Court,
District of Oregon, 1994, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, civil rights).
95. See id. (citing Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1438).
96. See id. (citing Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1438).
97. See id. at 127 (citing Lee, 891 F. Supp. at 1439).
98. See id.
99. In a lawsuit, the parties must have standing, meaning that they must have a legally
protectable and tangible interest at stake in the litigation. See BLACK'S LAw DIcriONARv,
supra note 51, at 978. The issue of standing involves whether the litigant is the proper
party to fight the lawsuit, not whether the issue itself is appropriate for the court's review.
See id.
100. See Ashbel S. Green & Erin Hoover, judge Gives Suicide Foes Another Try at Suit, PORT-
LAND OREGONIAN, Nov. 26, 1997, at Al. See also Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir.
1997).
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a woman with muscular dystrophy and two of her doctors, were not
personally harmed by the assisted suicide law. 1' The United States
Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal. 10 2
In the November, 1997 elections, Oregon voters defeated a mea-
sure to repeal the Death with Dignity Act by sixty percent to forty per-
cent.'0 3 However, the legal wrangling did not end there, as the
United States Senate and the House of Representatives considered
bills that would invalidate the law.' 4 In June, 1998, Senator Don
Nickles of Oklahoma introduced a bill that would have amended the
Controlled Substances Act 0 5 to prohibit doctors from prescribing le-
thal doses of pain-killers for terminally-ill patients.0 6 This amend-
ment would have therefore rendered the Oregon measure practically
inoperative.' 0 7 Although Senator Nickles was unsuccessful with his
bill, he plans to introduce it again when the 106'h Congress convenes
in January, 1999.108 A companion bill, introduced in the House of
Representatives, "stalled before a floor vote" in September, 1998.109
However, Oregon was not the only state where such legal battles were
raging. 110
Smith next analyzes Compassion in Dying v. Washington,"' in which
the group Compassion in Dying" 2 and three terminally ill patients
challenged Washington's law banning assisted suicide."' Smith notes
that the plaintiffs won in United States District Court, but he does not
discuss the District Court's reasoning. 1 4 The United States District
101. See Green & Hoover, supra note 100.
102. See Lee v. Harcleroad, 891 F. Supp. 1421 (D. Or. 1995), cert. denied sub. nom., 118 S.
Ct. 328 (1997).
103. See Gail Kinsey Hill, Lawmakers Might Halt Suicide Law Efforts, PORTLAND OREGONIAN,
Dec. 11, 1997, at D1.
104. See Jim Barnett & Dave Hogan, Senator Drops Effort to Block Suicide Law, PORTLAND
OREGONIAN, Oct. 15, 1998, at Al.
105. The Controlled Substances Act is part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 et seq. (1981).
106. See Barnett & Hogan, supra note 104.
107. See id.
108. See id Nickles "dropped his effort" to pass the bill after it appeared that he could
not insert the bill's language into the Omnibus Budget Bill. Id.
109. Id.
110. See infra notes 111-50 and accompanying text.
111. 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994), rev'd 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), affd en
banc 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702
(1997). The names of the parties changed on appeal after Forced Exit went to press.
112. Compassion in Dying, an offshoot of the Hemlock Society, provides counseling for
individuals contemplating suicide and assistance in committing suicide. See SMITH, supra
note 17, at 128.
113. See id. (discussing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 707).
114. See id.
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Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the liberty in-
terests of terminally ill adults to choose physician-assisted suicide and
that the statute unconstitutionally burdened this liberty interest.115
The District Court also found that the Washington statute banning
assisted suicide violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment'16 by banning assisted suicide while allowing terminally
ill patients to refuse life support.117
Next, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and held that Wash-
ington's law was constitutional.118 An eleven-judge panel of the same
court reheard the case and, in an 8-3 decision, found the law against
assisted suicide unconstitutional as it applied to the terminally ill. l1 9
Smith criticizes the outcome of the eleven-judge panel as creating new
constitutional rights while ignoring the words of the Constitution it-
self, ignoring judicial precedent, 2 ° and disregarding the results of the
election defeating Washington's Initiative 119.121 Smith also states
that this decision created a liberty interest that does not apply to all
people; instead, Compassion in Dying created a sliding scale in which
the state has a greater interest in preventing the suicide of young,
healthy people than of the terminally ill.' 22
Finally, Smith examines Quill v. Vacco'23 in which the plaintiffs
sought to have New York's law banning assisted suicide declared un-
constitutional.' 24 The trial court dismissed Quill's suit, and he ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.'25 Just weeks after the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Washington v.
Glucksberg'26 upholding the right to die, the United States Court of
115. See Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
116. Section 1, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment states, "No state shall... deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend
XIV, § 1.
117. See Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
118. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 128 (discussing Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49
F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995)).
119. See id. (discussing Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc)).
120. Precedent is "[a]n adjudged case or decision of a court, considered as furnishing
an example or authority for an identical or similar case afterwards arising or a similar
question of law." BlaCK's LAw DicnoNARY, supra note 51, at 814.
121. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 129.
122. See id. at 130.
123. 850 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd80 F.3d 716 (2d. Cir. 1996), rev'd 521 U.S. 723
(1997).
124. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 132 (discussing Quill, 80 F.3d at 718).
125. See id. (discussing Quill, 80 F.3d at 722).
126. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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Appeals for the Second Circuit countered that ruling and held that
assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest stemming from
the Constitution.1 27 Rather, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit used the Equal Protection clause of the Constitu-
tion128 to permit assisted suicide.1 29  Under the Equal Protection
clause, citizens who are similarly situated must be treated alike under
the law.' Therefore, the court concluded that terminally ill patients
who require life support and those-who do not require life support
are similarly situated; those who do not require life support and can-
not die by refusing treatment should have the right to assisted
suicide.13 1
Smith counters the Court of Appeals' reasoning by arguing that
dying a natural death, as would happen when life support is removed,
is not the same as being killed. 3 2 When a respirator is removed, doc-
tors cannot be certain that the patient will die; Karen Quinlan lived
for ten years after her respirator was removed.13 3 In assisted suicide,
the patient is certain to die after the doctor injects the necessary
medication.1 3 4
In June, 1997, after Forced Exit went to press, the United States
Supreme Court upheld both the Washington and New York stat-
utes. 1 35 In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court held that assisted sui-
cide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause.136 The Court noted that the Due Process Clause protects
rights and liberties that are "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition.' 137 The Court distinguished the asserted right to die
from previous cases, such as Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health,'"8 which allowed patients to refuse medical treatment.139 The
Court also noted society's consistent rejection of a right to die, from
127. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 132 (discussing Quill, 80 .F.3d at 724-25).
128. See supra note 116.
129. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 133 (discussing Quill, 80 F.3d at 725-31).
130. See id.
131. See id. at 134 (discussing Quill, 80 F.3d at 729).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See Roberto Suro, States to Become Forum for Fight Over Assisted Suicide: In Wake of
Justices'Ruling, Legislatures Will Play Key Role in Rights of the Terminally IlL, WASH. POST, June
27, 1997, at A19.
136. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997), revg 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.
1996), affgen banc49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'g850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
137. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977) (plurality opinion)).
138. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
139. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722-28.
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the common law punishment of suicide and assisted suicide in Eng-
land and the American colonies to the voters' rejection of Washing-
ton's and California's assisted suicide initiatives.14 ° Additionally, the
Court noted that Washington had a legitimate state interest in ban-
ning assisted suicide.141 In reaching this conclusion, the Court com-
pared the ban on assisted suicide to other homicide statues, noted
that certain groups, such as adolescents, the elderly, and depressed
individuals, are particularly at risk for suicide, and stated that Wash-
ington had an interest in protecting the medical profession's ethical
standards. 42 Finally, the Court noted the risk of involuntary euthana-
sia, citing statistics on involuntary euthanasia in the Netherlands.14
In Vacco v. Quill, the United States Supreme Court held that New
York's law banning assisted suicide did not violate the Equal Protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 4 The Court noted that
the Equal Protection Clause requires the states to treat similar cases
alike but does not impose such a requirement on differing cases.1 45
The Court noted several differences between the refusal of life-sus-
taining treatment and assisted suicide. 46 First, when life-sustaining
treatment is removed, the patient dies from the underlying condition
itself; whereas with lethal medication, the medication causes the
death.'47 The Court noted that a physician's intent varies with each
situation. 48 In withdrawing life support, the intent is to cease futile
treatment; in assisting suicide, the intent is to kill the patient.1 49 Fi-
nally, the Court noted that lower courts and state legislatures had con-
sistently distinguished between the withdrawal of treatment and
assisted suicide.
15 0
The Glucksberg and Vacco decisions were handed down after Forced
Exit went to press, so one can only speculate on Smith's reaction to
the decisions. It is likely that he would be pleased that the Court
found that there is no fundamental liberty interest in assisted suicide
and that the state has a legitimate interest in banning assisted suicide.
The Supreme Court's reasoning paralleled many of Smith's argu-
140. See id. at 711-19.
141. See id at 728.
142. See id. at 728-33.
143. See id. at 734-35.
144. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997).
145. See id. at 799.
146. See id. at 801-03.
147. See id. at 801.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 801-04.
150. See i& at 803-04.
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ments. However, the Court refused to hear an appeal of Lee v. Oregon,
thus allowing Oregon's assisted suicide statute to remain in effect.
The net result of the Court's rulings in Glucksberg and Vacco, combined
with its refusal to hear Lee, allows each state to make its own decisions
about assisted suicide.' 5 ' Whether this net result will lead to more
assisted suicide statutes, which would support Smith's slippery slope
argument, remains to be seen.
D. Forecast of the American Experience
Smith argues that the legalization of euthanasia in the United
States would be much more dangerous than in the Netherlands. 152
This is due in part to the differences between each country's health
care delivery systems.' 5 ' While the Netherlands provides free medical
care to almost all citizens, the United States has a profit-driven health-
care delivery system.' 54 For-profit health maintenance organizations
place financial pressures on doctors who provide too much care.155
Additional issues of concern in the United States include the limited
access for all citizens to hospice care, the lack of support for
caregivers, and the inadequate provision of pain control medica-
tions. 1 5  Therefore, the financial pressures on doctors to hasten
death may be much greater in the United States than in the
Netherlands. 15
7
Smith cites research showing that pain and depression in severely
ill patients are significantly undertreated and that minority, female,
elderly, or child patients are more likely to be undertreated for their
pain.158 Hospice care, as well as treatment for depression and pain, is
generally inaccessible to the uninsured American. 5 9  However,
Smith's greatest concern is the implementation of euthanasia and as-
sisted suicide under the for-profit American health care delivery
system. 1
60
Smith predicts that by the year 2000, fifty percent of all health-
insured Americans, as well as Medicare and Medicaid recipients, will
receive their health coverage through for-profit health maintenance
151. See Suro, supra note 135.
152. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 109.
153. See id.
154. See id,
155. See id. at 109-10.
156. See id at 149.
157. See id. at 110.
158. See id at 146-47.
159. See id at 149.
160. See id. at 150.
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organizations (HMOs). 6' Smith hypothesizes that since HMO profits
increase as costs decrease there could be a financial incentive behind
the decision to euthanize a patient, as the patient's death will end the
costs of continued care. 62 Smith also notes that managed care physi-
cians are often personally financially responsible for treatments, tests,
and specialists they recommend; moreover, these financial pressures
are already impacting doctors' medical decisions.1 6 Smith insinuates
that if these financial pressures are attached to end-of-life decision-
making, doctors may be even more likely to euthanize a patient than if
such financial pressures do not exist."
II. ANALYSIS
Some of Smith's arguments may trouble the reader, while others
appear to rest on a solid foundation and could even be strengthened.
First, one may be initially concerned by Smith's presumption that ter-
minally ill individuals are at higher risk for suicide.16 His distinction
between the removal of life support and artificial nutrition may not be
satisfactory to all readers. 66 Smith could strengthen his argument
concerning the pain associated with removal of artificial nutrition or
intravenous fluids.'6 7 Many of Smith's points could have greater im-
pact if he included any available statistics and studies to support his
theories. Finally, Smith needs to provide more realistic alternatives to
euthanasia than those he provides.
A. Are Terminally Ill Individuals at Higher Risk for Suicide?
A component of Forced Exit that initially appears troubling is
Smith's claim that individuals who are terminally ill are at higher risk
for suicide.' 68 It seems incongruous that people who are facing a
shortened life would choose to end their lives even sooner. How-
ever, suicide rates are higher among individuals with terminal illnesses
than in the population as a whole, and more than one third of dying
patients may be depressed. 169 A recent study, surveying nearly 1,000
patients whose doctors expected them to die within six to twelve
161. See id.
162. See id. at 153.
163. See id at 155.
164. See id at 157-58.
165. See id at 124.
166. See id. at 134-35.
167. See id. at 34-39.
168. See id. at 124.
169. See, e.g., Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, The Promise of a Good Death, 351
LANCET 21, 23 (1998).
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months, found that ten and one-half percent reported seriously con-
templating suicide. 170 Among those patients surveyed who reported
feeling depressed all or part of the time, twenty percent reported that
they had considered suicide."' Surprisingly, according to this study,
patients in pain were no more likely to consider suicide than those
who were not in pain. 172 Depression and dependence on others, not
pain, were the leading reasons the dying patients contemplated physi-
cian assisted suicide.1 73
This study weakens Smith's argument that inadequate medication
for pain control is a contributing factor to the likelihood of suicide
among the terminally ill. It also brings into question his argument
that those most likely to be undertreated for pain, women, minorities,
elderly individuals, and children,1 74 will be more at risk with legalized
euthanasia. However, the fact that dependence on others is a reason
terminally ill individuals consider suicide strengthens Smith's thesis
that greater access to hospice care and other support, especially for
the uninsured, 175 will be key in preventing abuses.
These surveys also strengthen Smith's arguments that provisions
in statutes such as Oregon's are not sufficient to ensure patients are
adequately screened for depression. Depression is under-recognized
and underestimated among the terminally ill,' 76 as assessment instru-
ments are ill-equipped to address the needs and concerns of dying
patients. 177 Many doctors dismiss depression as the patient's natural
reaction to impending death rather than as a condition that may have
existed prior to the illness.1 78
B. Smith's Distinction between the Removal of Artificial Respiration and
the Removal of Feeding Tubes
Smith's contention that removing a respirator is acceptable while
discontinuing artificial nutrition is not may not prove satisfactory to
many readers. Smith discusses the difference between medical and
170. See, e.g., Richard A. Knox, Pain is Found to Trail in Considering Suicide, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 20, 1998, at A13.
171. See id.
172. See id
173. See id
174. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 146-47 (citing DEP'T CONSUMER AFF., STATE OF CAL.,
SUMMIT ON EFFECTIVE PAIN MANAGEMENT: REVOKING IMPEDIMENTS TO APPROPRIATE PRESCRIB-
ING 3 (1994)).
175. See id. at 149.
176. See, e.g., Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 169, at 23.
177. See id
178. See Linda Emanuel, Facing Requests for Physician Assisted Suicide, 280 JAMA 643, 644
(1998).
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humane care1" 9 and notes that removing artificial ventilation protects
the patient from unwanted physical intrusions, but he does not ex-
plain why the feeding tube is not also an unwanted intrusion. °
Moreover, Smith barely discusses the case of Karen Ann Quinlin,
where the parents of a comatose woman were permitted to remove
their daughter from a respirator. 1 ' Finally, Smith criticizes the re-
moval of feeding tubes as a cruel and painful way of ending the lives
of these individuals.1 8 2
1. Medical Versus Humane Care
Recall that Smith defines humane care as a category of care that
includes warmth, shelter, and cleanliness a83 and describes medical
care as including interventions such as surgery, medications, and
tests.1 8 4 Smith argues that we would not deprive patients of humane
care by sending them out into a blizzard to freeze to death, even if
they requested it; therefore, we should not withdraw food and allow
those same patients to starve to death.8 5 Smith's moral argument is
strongly supported. For example, social and some religious values tell
us that it is only reasonable to feed individuals who are unable to care
for themselves.1 86 Therefore, feeding should be viewed as humane
care and not as treatment which a patient has the right to refuse.18 7
On the other hand, artificial nutrition may seem very much like
medical treatment. If artificial nutrition is required on a long-term
basis, a tube is surgically inserted into the stomach, a1 8 thus the provi-
sion of artificial nutrition is physically invasive. Artificial nutrition re-
places the bodily functions of chewing and swallowing for a patient
who has a functional digestive tract but can no longer take food by
mouth.189  Finally, as with other medical procedures, complications,
such as tube displacement into the respiratory tract or migration into
the esophagus, may result following the insertion of a feeding tube.1 90
179. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 4243.
180. See id at 134-35.
181. See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
182. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 50.
183. See id. at 4243. See also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
184. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 43. See also supra note 34 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 17, at 4243.
186. See, e.g., Jacquelyn A. Beatty, Artificial Nutrition and the Terminally Ill: How Should
Washington Decide?, 61 WASH. LAw REv. 419, 419 (1986); Paula McCormack, Quality of Life
and the Right to Die: An Ethical Dilemma, 28J. ADVANCED NURSING 63, 65 (1998).
187. See McCormack, supra note 186, at 65.
188. See THE LiPPONcoTr MANUAL OF NURSING PRscrICE 566 (Lisa Stead ed., 6th ed.
1996).
189. See id.
190. See id. at 569.
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From this perspective, one could understand why courts treat the re-
moval of life support and artificial nutrition similarly.
2. Smith's Analysis of In re Quinlan
Smith barely touches upon In re Quinlan.9' This is a key omis-
sion. When Karen Quinlan remained in a persistent vegetative state
after a drug overdose, her father sought to have her respirator re-
moved.192 Ruling in her father's favor, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey noted the United States Supreme Court's recognition that
although the Constitution does not explicitly mention privacy, certain
privacy rights exist,193 especially in the areas of family life decisions. 94
The Quinlan court concluded that the privacy right found in Roe v.
Wade for a woman to terminate her pregnancy could also include the
right to refuse medical treatment under certain circumstances.195
Since Smith bases his argument on his assertion that artificial nutri-
tion is a form of humane care, and not medical treatment, he could
have included a summary of the legal reasoning behind allowing pa-
tients to refuse treatment. Even though Smith plays the role of an
advocate, an understanding of Quinlan would greatly assist the reader
in reaching his or her own conclusion.
3. Does the Removal of Artificial Nutrition Cause a Painful Death?
Smith describes dehydration as a cruel and painful way to allow a
patient to die, focusing upon conscious patients who are severely dis-
abled but not in a persistent vegetative state.' 9 6 He describes the phys-
ical effects of dehydration, notes that doctors are uncertain about how
much discomfort these individuals may feel, and suggests that doctors
cannot be certain pain medication will ease the symptoms. 1 97 How-
ever, other doctors report that even if the patient were conscious he
or she would experience discomfort for only a day or two, at which
time the body would begin to produce ketones that suppress hunger
and thirst.198
191. 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
192. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 134 (citing Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 651).
193. See Quinlan, 355 A-2d at 663 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972);
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969)).
194. See id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973)).
195. See id.
196. See id. at 50.
197. See id
198. See Brook A. Masters & Bill Broadway, Changes Will Be Slow, Painless As Newscaster
Drifts to Death, WASH. PosT, Oct. 3, 1998, at B6.
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Smith does not express whether he believes persons in a persis-
tent vegetative state can feel the pain associated with dehydration.
Many doctors contend that patients in a persistent vegetative state do
not experience hunger, thirst, or pain.199 Although the patient's body
may exhibit the physical signs of stress, the patient is unable to iden-
tify the discomfort as hunger or to remember pain.20 0 However, a
survey of over three hundred physicians, approximately half of which
were neurologists, showed that thirty percent of the physicians be-
lieved that patients in a persistent vegetative state can experience pain
and thirteen percent believed they could feel hunger and thirst.21
While these beliefs may be representative of a minority of doctors,
they certainly would provide additional support for Smith's position if
he had cited them.
C. Smith Fails to Use Statistics to Support His Arguments
Another difficulty for the reader may be the lack of statistical sup-
port for Smith's arguments. One of the few times Smith provides sta-
tistics to back his arguments is when he uses the results of the
Remmelink report to demonstrate the extent to which euthanasia is
practiced and abused in the Netherlands. 20 2 In some instances, study
results support Smith's contentions; in other instances, statistics
weaken his arguments.
For example, recent research supports Smith's argument that the
persistent vegetative state is often misdiagnosed and that patients who
have some levels of consciousness may be having their artificial nutri-
tion discontinued. 20 1 It is estimated that between 14,000 to 35,000
Americans have been labeled as being in a persistent vegetative state
by their physicians. 2 4 Alarmingly, between twenty-seven to forty-three
percent of patients labeled as vegetative actually show some minimal
signs of consciousness. 20 5 It is possible that some of the individuals
included in Smith's case studies, such as Michael Martin,20 6 may fall
into this category.
As a matter of fact, specialists have been working for the past four
years to define another category of brain injury for people who are
199. See, e.g., id.
200. See id.
201. See Kirk Payne, Physicians' Attitudes About the Care of Patients in the Persistent Vegetative
State: A National Survey, 125 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 104, 104 (1996).
202. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 97-101.
203. See, e.g., Conscious of a Life in the Balance, supra note 1.
204. See id
205. See id.
206. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
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severely disabled but whose disability is less serious than a vegetative
patient.20 7 These patients could be described as being in a minimally
conscious state, which is defined as "a condition of severely altered
consciousness in which the person demonstrates minimal but definite
behavioral evidence of self or environmental awareness. ' 2°8 Such pa-
tients are similar in appearance to vegetative patients but may respond
to stimuli, feel pain, communicate through gestures, and track visitors
with their eyes. °0 This minimally conscious state may be a temporary
step on the path from a vegetative state to a higher level of conscious-
ness, or it may be permanent. 210 Patients in a permanent minimally
conscious state, despite their slightly higher level of functioning, have
no better prognosis for recovery.21
1
While the personal stories throughout the book are what make it
so compelling, the reader is unsure whether Smith has merely found
the one-in-a-million situation or whether the problems he addresses
are widespread. Providing information about the number of people
in a persistent vegetative state and the number of patients whose fami-
lies seek to have artificial nutrition removed would assist the reader in
understanding the depth of the problem and in future decision-mak-
ing. Also, if Smith had provided the reader with information about
minimally conscious state, rather than labeling the people in his sto-
ries as conscious, the reader could have understood how difficult and
delicate these ethical questions are. A reader's decision to cast his or
her vote either for or against physician assisted suicide may depend on
knowing how many individuals are faced with an assisted suicide deci-
sion. Since Smith does not offer such statistics, the reader is unable to
determine whether such situations occur frequently or whether Smith
has cited the very emotional but very rare cases.
D. Are Smith's Solutions Feasible?
Smith offers a variety of alternatives to euthanasia, including bet-
ter training for doctors in pain management, increased accessibility of
hospice care, and education for all members of society about the dy-
ing process.212 Smith's suggestion to improve pain management
training is well-founded; however, researchers are not certain what an
207. See Conscious of a Life in the Balance, supra note 1.
208. Ronald E. Cranford, The Vegetative and Minimally Conscious States: Ethical Implications,
53 GERlATRICS 70, 71 (1998).
209. See Conscious of a Life in the Balance, supra note 1.
210. See Cranford, supra note 208, at 71.
211. See Conscious of a Life in the Balance, supra note 1.
212. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 226-35, 246-49.
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ideal rate of pain relief is. Surveys of terminally ill patients and their
families indicate that pain is under-treated in the last days of life. One
study found that twenty-five percent of dying cancer patients exper-
ienced severe pain and another forty to fifty percent described their
pain as moderate to severe. 213 In another study, interviews with 3357
surrogates of dying patients showed that forty percent of conscious
patients reported severe pain during the last three days of life. 214 Bar-
riers to effective pain relief cited by the researchers include inade-
quate training and dysfunctional organization within the delivery
system.2 15 The authors of this study admit that no one knows what
rate of pain relief could be achieved with optimal care.216 Other pain
research shows that pain can readily be relieved in seventy to ninety
percent of cancer patients and that much of the remaining ten to
thirty percent of patients can receive pain relief without complete
sedation. 7
However, providing sufficient pain relief may not be as simple as
it first appears. One would think that if the patient or the patient's
family members notified the hospital staff that the patient was in pain,
dosage could be increased; however, patients are reluctant to com-
plain about pain.218 But doctors may also be afraid to provide the
amounts of medication needed to adequately relieve a patient's
pain.2 1 9 Drug-prescribing laws may either be outdated or misinter-
preted by state licensing boards.220 Licensing boards carefully moni-
tor a physician's actions, and a doctor who provides more pain
medication than is believed to be reasonably prudent may have her/
his license to practice medicine restricted. 22 1
213. See APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT THE END OF LIFE 132 (Institute of
Medicine ed. 1997) [hereinafter APPROACHING DEATH].
214. See Joanne Lynn et al., Perceptions by Family Members of the Dying Experience of Older and
Seriously Ill Patients, 126 ANNALS INaRNAL MED. 97, 100 (1997).
215. See id. at 104.
216. See id. at 104-05.
217. See APPROACHING DEATH, supra note 213, at 132.
218. See Janice Lynch Schuster, Addressing Patients'Pain: Veterans Health Administration's
Addition of Fifth Vital Sign May Have Far-Reaching Effects, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1999, at Z28.
219. See U.S. Patients Do Not Always Get the Best End-of-Life Care, 349 LANCET 1747, 1747
(1997).
220. See id.
221. See, e.g., Hoover v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 676 So.2d 1380 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996). The Board of Medicine penalized Dr. Hoover and restricted her license to
practice. See id. at 1380. The Board claimed that Dr. Hoover excessively prescribed con-
trolled substances to seven of her patients who were in intractable pain, thus falling below
the standard of care of a reasonable physician under similar conditions or circumstances.
See id.
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Adequate hospice care is out of reach for many Americans. Only
one percent of all Medicare spending currently goes to providing hos-
pice care, despite the fact that one-third of the $210 billion Medicare
budget is used to treat patients during the last year of their lives.
22 2
The reason for this is unclear. Medicare requires patients to have a
life expectancy of less than six months to qualify for hospice care, yet
the median stay in hospice care for Medicare patients is only thirty-six
days.223 Smith argued that doctors are unable to predict with cer-
tainty when a patient has six months or less to live. 2 24 This uncertainty
may contribute to the under-utilization of hospice care. Doctors may
need additional education about the hospice alternatives available to
patients.
Changing cultural attitudes toward dying in our society will prove
difficult. While a century ago family members cared for dying rela-
tives, today dying persons are cared for in hospitals and nursing
homes; thus many Americans have never had a close personal experi-
ence with death.225 The American culture has been described as
"death denying," viewing death as an accident that could be prevented
with further research or improvements in technology. 226 Although
well-intended, the implementation of many of Smith's ideals into
practice may be unrealistic, given the finite resources of medical
schools, hospitals, and the government.
III. CONCLUSION
Although Smith's use of individual stories to present his argu-
ment has its drawbacks, it is this narrative style that makes the book
such an easy and interesting read. Smith's storytelling style and expla-
nations of legal and medical terminology make the information in
Forced Exit accessible to all individuals, not just to medical and legal
professionals. Despite the fact that Supreme Court decisions, elec-
tions, and legislative activity have dated Smith's legal analysis, Forced
Exit provides the reader with food for thought and offers a key per-
spective on end-of-life decision making.
222. SeeJoseph A. Califano, Jr., Physician Assisted Living, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1998, at
A27.
223. See APPROACHING DEATH, supra note 213, at 40.
224. See SMITH, supra note 17, at 122-23.
225. See id. at 33.
226. Id. at 48.
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